IIIM Magazine Online, Special Feature, October 15, 2001
PASTORAL AND SOCIAL ETHICS
Lecture Outline, Part Two: Christian Ethics (Basic Principles)
I. Christian Ethics: The Normative Perspective (Christian Deontological Ethics)
A. God Himself as Norm:
1. “God is light,” I John 1:5, 4:8ff.
2. Union of God Himself with His revelation (cf. course in Scripture and God):
i. Divine attributes ascribed to them.
ii. Uniquely divine acts performed by them.
iii. Worship directed to them.
B. The Word of God as Norm (cf. course in Scripture and God. To say that God’s Word is authoritative is to say that it is normative for ethics. On that score, no further argument is necessary.)
1. The Word that comes through nature and history:
2. The Word that comes in persons.
| a. | The Word is identified with God Himself and with Christ, while the Spirit is said to bring the revelation home to man’s heart. Thus, God mediates His Own Word. | |
|---|---|---|
| b. | The Word is also found in man: | |
| i. | “The work of the law” written upon the heart of man (Romans 2:14f.): All men, by nature, have access to the basic requirements of God. These are essentially the same as those given in the written law, but now communicated through another medium (cf. Murray on Romans). | |
| ii. | In the regenerate, the Word is written on the heart. This is a much more profound relation between the Word and man than is spoken of in i. The writing of the Word on the heart implies not only knowledge of obligation, | |
but actual obedience to that obligation, obedience from the heart (Jeremiah 31:33f.; cf. Deuteronomy 6:6, Proverbs 3:3, etc.) Cf. Doctrine of the Word, “The Word as God’s Presence”.
iii. The example of apostles, teachers: I Corinthians 4:16, 11:1, Philippians 3:17, I Thessalonians 1:6, 2:6, II Thessalonians 3:7-9, Hebrews 13:7, I Timothy 2:12.
c. This biblical teaching shows the overlap between normative and existential perspectives. We shall explore these matters further when we consider the existential perspective.
3. The Word as spoken and written language.
i. The covenant document is authored by the Lord and stands as the supreme norm of covenant life.
ii. The prophetic message claims divine authorship. The prophet is one who speaks God’s Word.
iii. Same for the apostolic message.
4. Unity of the Word: The same God is speaking in all the media, and His message is consistent in all of them.
| a. | Nature-history and Scripture | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| i. | Psalm 33:4-11: The written law is binding because it is in essential unity | ||
| with the creative word which inevitably comes to pass. | |||
| ii. | Psalm 19: Note the implicit correlation between the revelation in creation | ||
| (1-6) and in the law (7ff.). (Cf. Romans 10:13-17 with 18: Natural and | |||
| special revelation as one organism). | |||
| iii. Psalm 147:15-20. | |||
| b. | Person-revelation and Scripture. | ||
| i. | The “law” in the phrases “work of the law” and “law written on the heart” | ||
| is the law of God, particularly that given through Moses. Thus, the “law | |||
| on the heart,” far from being an alternative to the written law, is the | |||
| written law inscribed upon our being. | |||
| ii. | The witness of revelatory persons in Scripture (Christ, the Spirit, the | ||
| apostles and prophets) unanimously endorses the truth of Scripture. | |||
| c. | Scripture also validates the others, affirming their unity with itself. | ||
C. Ethics and the Attributes of Scripture
1. Power
2. Authority (the attribute particularly linked to the normative function)
a. At each turning point in human history, the issue facing man is the question of how he will respond to the spoken or written Word of God.
i. Genesis 1:28ff: Man’s original task defined by the Word.
ii. Genesis 2:17: The probation which is to determine his status as righteous or sinner, defined by the Word.
iii. The Fall: Substitution of the word of a talking animal (Satan) for that of God. Ultimately, substitution of one’s own word for God’s.
i) Of God’s Name ii) Of the History of Redemption iii) Of blessings and curses resulting from obedience or disobedience iv) Concerning Covenant Administration
vi. Jesus a) His perfect obedience defined by the Law. b) His life directed by biblical prophecy. c) He attests the authority of the Old Testament. d) He sets forth His Own word as the supreme test of discipleship (John
12:47ff., etc.). e) He provides for additional revelation through His apostles.
vii. Apostles a) Attest the authority of the Old Testament—cf. II Timothy 3:16;
II Peter 1:21.
b) Claim to speak and write the Words of God.
c) Claim that their words in oral and written form are the supreme test of
discipleship. viii.The Last Judgment: the criterion will be the word of Christ, John 12:48.
b. As ultimate criterion, Scripture, therefore, is to function as a basic commitment (or presupposition) for all our life. All choices must be consistent with the truth of Scripture.
| i. | Scripture has the ultimate say in defining what our duties are. Ethical |
| behavior is keeping the word of the Lord, Deut. 6:4ff, Luke 8:15, John | |
| 17:6, 1 Tim. 6:20, 1 John 3:24, 5:2-3. | |
| ii. | The basis of duty, then, is not a rational abstraction (non-Christian |
| deontological ethics) nor mere empirical examination of the causes and |
effects of actions (non-Christian teleological ethics), nor the autonomous moral self (non-Christian existential ethics).
iii. The autonomy of the reason or the moral self is thus radically rejected, and with them, the whole tradition of secular ethics.
b) Non-Christian systems, however, render the very concept of duty unintelligible.
3. Clarity
4. Necessity
5. Sufficiency (of Scripture for ethics)
a. Formulation. “The whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man’s salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequences may be deduced from Scripture: unto which nothing at any time is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit, or traditions of men.” (Westminster Confession of Faith I:vi).
i. Sufficiency is not limited to “matters of salvation” in some narrow sense. Rather it is comprehensive. Scripture is sufficient to reveal God’s will in all matters.
a) The Confession’s statement does mention salvation explicitly; however:
i) The Confession does not regard salvation as something narrowly “religious” as opposed to some other area of life. Salvation is of the whole person.
ii) Besides salvation, the Confession refers to “all things necessary for His own glory,” “faith,” and “life.”
iii) Nor is it possible to confine “faith” and “life” to some particular area of life. Faith is what we believe and life is what we do (cf. Shorter Catechism, Question 3).
b) Scripture places no limit on the sufficiency of Scripture in telling us the will of God. Rather, it speaks comprehensively of the sufficiency of Scripture to equip us “for every good work.”
c) This is not to say that Scripture contains all the world’s information or instructs us in all human skills. The point: in any area of life, our duty toward God will be an application of Scripture. For the concept of “application” see section iii.
ii. Scripture is not merely sufficient as a general guide by which we discover ethical norms beyond Scripture. Scripture contains all the norms (vs. some Dooyeweerdian representations).
a) Scripture draws a sharp distinction between the sufficient word of God and the traditions of men. To promulgate a norm as God’s will which is not an application of Scripture is to deny that distinction.
b) This misunderstanding gains its plausibility from the fact that indeed we do need extra-Scriptural information to apply Scripture. But that fact does not imply that we have duties which are not applications of Scripture.
c) Scripture never speaks of any extra-biblical norms which are not also found in Scripture. Romans 3:1f., in fact, may imply that the Scriptures contain a much fuller transcript of God’s will than what is available to the Gentiles in natural revelation.
iii. Scripture is not sufficient merely as a supplement to natural law.
a) Four types of law in Thomas Aquinas’ conception:
i) Eternal law (in God’s mind)
ii) Natural law
(1) The counterpart of eternal law in the created world
(2) Enables us through natural reason to discern what is good iii) Human law (civil statutes, etc.) iv) Divine law (Scripture)
(1) Adds what we must know to attain our supernatural end
(2) presupposes the general structure of natural law b) Comments: i) Built on a scheme which radically distinguishes between natural and supernatural ends (cf. critique of this under situational
perspective). ii) Fails to reckon with the noetic effects of sin. iii) Puts the Scriptural doctrines on the faulty foundation of apostate
(Aristotelian) natural reason. iv) Eliminates the sufficiency of Scripture in any meaningful sense. Not Scripture, but Scripture plus Aristotle becomes our working ethical authority.
iv. Sufficiency does not rule out the use, even the necessity, of extra-biblical information in the determination of our duty. (Cf. the relation of presuppositions to evidences in apologetics.)
a) As we have seen, God is revealed in the whole creation, though that revelation is opposed by the natural man.
b) Creation is the necessary medium by which the law is applied to specific situations.
i) Note the “moral syllogism”: Sabbath breaking is wrong Operating a factory on Sunday is Sabbath breaking Operating a factory on Sunday is wrong. To evaluate that syllogism, you need to know, not only something about the Bible, but also extra-biblical information. Most moral reasoning is of this kind.
ii) Scripture itself assumes that man will use his knowledge of creation in applying God’s law. When God told Adam to abstain from the forbidden fruit, Adam had the knowledge of creation to distinguish trees from other things and to single out a particular tree in view, etc. God does not spell out explicitly in his revelation all this information. To do so would be ludicrous.
iii) In Scripture, men are rebuked for failing to make such applications to current questions (Matthew 16:3, 22:29; Luke 24:25; John 5:39f, Romans 15:4; II Timothy 3:16f, II Peter 1:19-21 [in context]).
iv) If such applications of Scripture were not permitted, we could not use Scripture at all. We would then lack, in effect, not only the applications, but the norm itself. The meaning of Scripture is its application.
c) Thus, human reasoning also has a role in moral decision making. The sufficiency of Scripture must not be taken to deny that. We are not, of course, speaking of autonomous reason, but reason subject to God’s Word (“analogical”). Thus, the Confession speaks of “good and necessary consequence”.
d) And, thus, the Confession speaks of matters which are to be ordered by “the light of nature and Christian prudence, according to the general rules of the Word, which are always to be observed”.
v. Sufficiency does not rule out the use, even the necessity, of the illumination of the Spirit for a saving understanding of Scripture, for its proper use and application. Note statement in confession to this effect.
vi. Summary: a) Scripture contains all the ultimate norms for the Christian life in all its aspects. b) Natural revelation also contains norms, but none that are not in Scripture also. c) The norms of Scripture must be applied with the help of natural revelation and the illumination of the Spirit. d) Such applications, when correct, set forth the meaning of Scripture, its
demand in a situation, and therefore are not to be regarded as extra-Scriptural.
d. The “adiaphora” (literally, “no difference,” “indifferent”).
i. History a) Among the Church Fathers, the term was applied to actions such as eating meat which were considered to be neither right nor wrong in themselves. b) During the Reformation, Luther applied the term to certain Roman forms of worship which he felt were neither commanded nor forbidden
by Scripture and thus could be practiced by the believer in good conscience. Later, further controversy developed as to whether
Protestant could acquiesce in church rites imposed by Roman Catholic rulers.
c) In the late 1930’s, there was a split in the Presbyterian Church of America (later OPC) partly based on the issue of “Christian liberty”. Specifically, the question was whether total abstinence from alcoholic beverages was required by Scripture, or whether such use of alcohol was an adiaphoron.
ii. Adiaphora is an ambiguous and misleading concept. a) Taken literally (as a Greek neuter plural), it refers to things which are in some sense “indifferent.” Thus often people refer to meat or wine or tables or chairs as “things indifferent”. Generally, I think this is a shorthand way of talking about the human use of the “things”. However, referring to “things” as indifferent can lead us to forget the biblical teaching that everything in creation is good (Genesis 1:31; I Timothy 4:4). There is no biblical distinction between some things which are good and others which are bad or indifferent. b) More commonly, the word refers specifically to human acts. However, we should bear in mind that according to Scripture all human acts are either pleasing or displeasing to God. I Corinthians 10:31; Romans 14:23; Colossians 3:17, (cf. 23) show that all human acts are under God’s evaluation as good or bad. c) One sometimes hears, also, the above in modified form: “acts concerning which Scripture is silent”. But the above texts indicate that Scripture speaks concerning all our acts, and so is not silent about anything. Significantly, I Corinthians 10:31 and Romans 14:23 occur in contexts dealing with matters which have traditionally been called adiaphora. d) A more common and more defensible use of the term is formulated in this quote from the Lutheran theologian Robert Preus in Baker’s Dictionary of Christian Ethics “acts or church rites which in themselves are neither morally right or wrong, but matters of Christian liberty.” Note the modifying phrase “in themselves”. The point is that these acts are right in some situations and wrong in others. Surely there are some actions in this class, but the use of adiaphora and the phrase “neither morally right or wrong” disguise the fact that every act in the class is right or wrong in God’s sight. e) Another possibility: Adiaphora are choices that are not between good and evil, but between two goods. This is an important concept, but I’m not convinced that the term adiaphora helps to expound it. f) Finally: Adiaphora are acts that in a certain situation are neither commanded nor prohibited by Scripture. Again, this is an important notion, but the term conceals the important fact that such an act is, not morally neutral, but good in God’s sight.
g) Conclusion: Adiaphora is used for too many different concepts, some of them quite unscriptural. Its use in communicating legitimate
Scriptural concepts is vitiated by its connotation of moral neutrality. Such neutrality is everywhere rejected by Scripture.
iii. There is, however, an important point raised by the adiaphora discussion, and that is the liberty of the Christian from the religious and ethical ordinances of men, or, in other words, the sufficiency of Scripture for ethics. (The Christian, to be sure, is subject to the ordinances of men for the Lord’s sake, I Peter 2:13. But these ordinances can never be his ultimate authority, and they must be defied when they conflict with divine revelation.) That this is the central point of the debate can be seen from the classical “adiaphora-texts”:
a) Romans 14:1-15:13
i) Setting
(3) Both groups are Christians (3, 15).
ii) Problems (important to distinguish):
(a) Not only a cause of grief to him (19), but:
• tending to overthrow the work of God (20) (The work of God, of course, cannot be overthrown. The
language, however, shows the supreme destructiveness of the stumbling block.)
(23) iii) Solutions
iv) The main thrust of Paul’s injunction: Do not play God. God, not man is the judge of right and wrong.
b) I Corinthians 8-10 i) Setting
ii) Problems (Same as those in Romans).
iii) Solutions
iv) Note again, the inadequacy of “adiaphora” to convey the moral intensity of the situation. There is nothing morally neutral about becoming an idolater through violation of conscience. I Corinthians 9 is especially significant in showing the intensely moral considerations which govern Paul himself in decisions on how to use the good things of creation.
c) I Timothy 4:1-5: Some advocate abstinence from marriage and meats. The operative point is that God has created all things good, and thus, man has no right to despise them.
d) Colossians 2:16f.: Some try to “judge” others about feasts, etc. The relevant point in context is the triumph of Christ over principalities and powers. We hold fast to him, not to men or angels. Again, the opposite of ethical indifference is presented.
D. Parts and Aspects of Scripture as Norms Scripture is a diversity in unity. In seeking to use Scripture as our ethical norm, we
cannot avoid the question of how the various parts and aspects are related to one another. Ethics presupposes hermeneutics (as well as vice-versa!).
1. Different Forms of Language
2. Gospel, Law, and Redemptive History (or: the relation of biblical and systematic theology in the development of a Christian ethic). Compare discussion of “biblico-theological extremism” under the definition of “moralism” in the beginning of this outline.
i. Certainly, Scripture is a history in that it records and interprets the historical events mentioned earlier, and in their historical context.
ii. Scripture, however, is different from modern histories.
a) It includes, for instance, a law code, a song book, a collection of proverbs, a set of letters—and not merely as historical source-material!
b) All of these, and the historical material too, are intended not merely to give us historical information, but to govern our lives here and now (Romans 15:4; II Timothy 3:16f., etc.).
c) As often pointed out, the Gospels are not biographies of Jesus. They are Gospels. Their purpose is not merely to inform, but to elicit faith. Most histories do not have this purpose.
iii. It would, of course, be possible to define “history” so broadly as to include all these functions. One could speak of the Psalms and Proverbs as in some sense “interpretation” of historical events. But such definitions are so far removed from normal language as to be misleading. “Interpretation” in the usual sense is not the chief purpose of Psalms and Proverbs.
vi. But to say that Scripture is normative history is to say that Scripture is not only history, but also law, and that “history” and “law” are at least equally important characterizations of Scripture.
vii. Such correlation between history and law is to be expected if, as Kline argues, Scripture is a “suzerainty treaty”.
viii.Scripture is also Gospel—its intention is to bring the good news of Christ to elicit faith in Him.
a) Christ is not only central to history, He is central also as the eternal lawgiver (Word), as the wisdom of God, as prophet, priest, and king. It therefore could be argued that a more flexible approach to Scripture does more justice to the centrality of Christ than does an approach which gives primacy to history.
b) The death, resurrection, and ascension of Christ and the Pentecostal outpouring are important not merely as historical happenings (though over against the skepticism of modern thought, it is vitally important to affirm them as historical happenings). They are also vitally important in their present impact upon us, not least in their normative function. Romans 12:1ff.; Ephesians 4:1ff.
i. Redemptive history is the setting in which the law is given. We must understand redemptive history in order to understand and apply the law.
ii. The grace of God given in redemptive history gives to us the righteousness of Christ by imputation and the power to keep the law by sanctification.
iii. Reflection upon redemptive history motivates us to obey. We obey, not simply because we are commanded to, but out of gratefulness for what God has done and an in-wrought desire to obey. Exodus 20:2; Deuteronomy 5:15; Colossians 3:1ff.
vi. Since ethics is inevitably application, it must not only look back upon redemptive history (and ahead to the parousia), but must focus upon the present, exhorting us to our present duties in the name of Christ.
3. Law and Gospel
i. Enumeration: a) “External discipline”—to restrain sin in society (Formula of Concord,
Article VI) b) Law as a means to drive men to Christ by exposing their sin. c) Law as a rule by which the regenerate may shape their lives.
ii. The Lutherans accept all three uses of the law (as over against some among them who denied that the law should be preached to the regenerate). They base this use of the law upon the incompleteness of sanctification in the regenerate, and therefore, the believers continuing need of threat, “sharp urgency”.
iii. Works of the Spirit, however, are such as can be produced by no threat or constraint whatever. (“. . .as if they had never received any precept, had never heard any threats, and expected no remuneration.”) As such, believers “live in the Law”; i.e., they conform to the law, but not by threat or constraint.
b) However, living in the Spirit is living in response to a command (Galatians 5:16, etc.). It is preposterous to suppose that obeying this command puts us in the sphere of the flesh.
c) It should not be supposed that sanctification is achieved without struggle, without constraint.
4. Law and Grace (see Murray, 181ff.)
5. Old and New Covenants
i. Now, we live looking back on the accomplishment of redemption, not looking forward to it as under the Old Covenant. a) Thus, the believer has a much greater power to do good works because of the great fullness of the Spirit poured out on Pentecost. b) Thus, the believer has a firmer assurance that his sins are forgiven. c) Thus, he has a stronger motive to holiness: i) Gratefulness for the love shown to him in Christ. ii) A firmer assurance that sin can be overcome by the power of God. iii) The example of Jesus’ love.
d) Hence, appeal to the work of Christ and its results (presence of the Spirit, unity of the body, etc.) become the chief motivations of New Testament ethics. It is these facts, more than the mere fact that holiness is God’s will, which motivates the exhortations of the New Testament. (Note “therefore” in Romans 12, etc.)
e) The NT does sometimes appeal to the law, however, to motivate obedience (Matt. 5:17-20, 7:12, 12:5, 22:36-40, 23:23, Luke 10:26, John 8:17, Rom. 8:4, 13:8-10,1 Cor. 9:8-9, 14:34, Gal. 4:21-22, 2 Tim. 3:16-17, Jas. 2:8.)
ii. What change is there in the believer’s obligation as a result of the covenantal change? What stays the same?
a) The fundamental requirement of love is the same (Deuteronomy 6:5; Leviticus 19:18; Matthew 22:37ff.; parallels; John 13:34f., many
Johannine parallels) with a new clarity, motivation and example (“as I have loved you”).
b) Our obligation to keep the law in general remains intact, Matthew 5:17-20.
c) While the whole law remains binding, its application is different in many respects.
i) A change of situation always brings about a change in application. The application of the Torah to city life is different from its application to a largely agricultural society.
ii) The change from Old Covenant to New brings about some rather broad changes in the situation in which we apply the law.
iii) Since the situation changes in these ways, the status of the law changes as well.
6. Moral, Ceremonial, and Civil Law
a. The traditional discussion
i. The Westminster Confession (XIX:i-v) distinguishes three kinds of law: a) Moral, given at creation, summarized in the Decalogue, perpetually binding and useful under the gospel (i, ii, v, vi)
b) Ceremonial, prefiguring Christ and giving moral instruction, all of which are abrogated under the New Testament (iii).
c) Judicial (sometimes called civil), given to govern Israel as a political entity. These expired with that state, “not obliging any other now, further than the general equity may require.”
ii. Controversy has existed:
a) Concerning the three-fold distinction itself.
b) Concerning the status of the civil law.
b. Evaluation of the three-fold distinction.
i. The distinction is not found explicitly in Scripture. Scripture speaks simply of “the law,” both positively and negatively. It is “the law” which Jesus did not come to destroy (Matthew 5:17-20). It is “the law” to which men are in bondage because of sin. It is “the law” from which we are set free in Christ. The Old Testament, too, does not list its statutes in such neat groups. “Moral,” “ceremonial,” and “civil” statutes are placed alongside each other and mixed together with no apparent concern about possible category-confusion.
ii. It is important, therefore, to say that the most basic changes wrought by the New Covenant in this area affect, not one part of the law, but the law as a whole.
iii. It is not always easy to distinguish these three categories. a) They don’t come neatly labeled in the OT. Typically, they are mixed together. b) Laws traditionally called “ceremonial” do not pertain only to ceremonies, but to many other things, like diet, clothing, economics (the Sabbatical years and Jubilee), etc. c) The Confession’s discussion makes it look as though the way to find if a law is currently binding is to determine first which of the three categories it belongs to. However, it more often happens that we
determine which laws are binding first, and then decide which bin to put them in.
iv. Nevertheless, the three-fold distinction does reflect a genuine distinction within the divine government—the prophetic, priestly, and kingly functions.
a) Moral law corresponds closely to the prophetic office, which sets forth God’s demand for righteousness.
b) Ceremonial law (called law of expiation in an earlier discussion) corresponds to the priestly office, which concerns particularly man’s need of expiation from sin.
c) Civil law corresponds to the kingly office, which governs the covenant commonwealth.
c. Evaluation of the discussion concerning continuation / abrogation.
i. To summarize our earlier discussion: It is best to say that the law as a whole is subject to changes in application because of the advent of the New Covenant.
ii. Ideally, then, it is best not to raise the question in terms of the general categories moral, ceremonial, and civil. Rather, having seen something of the overall change in our relation to the law, we ought then to study each particular statute to see how it is affected by the overall change.
iii. This task, however, can be facilitated if we learn to make at least rough groupings among types of laws, determining those groupings primarily by the functions of the laws in the history of redemption. The distinction between moral, ceremonial, and civil, then, can be an aid to us.
iv. The ceremonial law. a) Sacrifices and cleansing regulations are no longer literally binding because they are but shadows of the work of Christ (Colossians 2:1317; Hebrews 9:8-10; 10:1-18). b) Dietary laws are not literally binding because they are a form of cleansing law, prefiguring the purity of Christ. Enforced under the New Covenant, they would encourage the misconception that the Kingdom of God is food and drink, Mark 7:14-23, esp. verse 19;
I Corinthians 8-10; Romans 14; Acts 10:9-16, 11:2-10. c) The calendar of feasts is treated similarly, Colossians 2:16f. d) The fundamental requirement of these laws is still binding, that we
approach the holy hill of God with clean hands and a pure heart, i.e., with the righteousness of Christ. We come to God bearing sacrifice— the once-for-all sacrifice of Christ.
e) The ceremonial laws continue to instruct us concerning that righteousness. f) Do some of the “ceremonial” laws bear upon human health and safety? More work is needed on this subject.
v. The moral law. a) In general, the authority of the “moral” statutes is reaffirmed in the
New Testament and most all of the Old Testament ethical principles are specifically reinforced. i) Statements about the authority of the law (Matthew 5:17ff.) or the
moral teaching of the Old Testament (II Timothy 3:16f., etc.). ii) Authoritative use of the Old Testament in moral discussion: Matthew 5-7; James 2:8; Mark 7:10; Romans 13:8-10; Ephesians 6:2f., etc. iii) Reiteration of Old Covenant moral principles, Ephesians 4-6, etc.
b) Changes i) The law is no longer a curse and threat because of Christ. ii) Since our sins are forgiven and the Spirit dwells within, the law is
now in a greater sense than under the Old Covenant, a delight. iii) We have a stronger motivation to holiness. iv) The New Covenant revelation completes the canon. The moral law
has been revealed once-for-all, and our business is application of that, not waiting expectantly for further revelation.
vi. The civil law (Bahnsen, Theonomy in Christian Ethics, Poythress, The Shadow of Christ in the Law of Moses). a) Obvious Changes
i) The New Covenant no longer identifies the Kingdom of God with an earthly political unit. We belong to a heavenly city, under Christ, the King. Thus, there is no requirement of loyalty to national Israel. The Kingdom of God is not to be defended by the sword.
ii) Some of the civil laws clearly are addressed to a particular historical situation, e.g., the division of Canaan into portions for the various families of Israel, the consultation of Urim and Thummim, etc.
b) Does the kingship of Christ, however, eliminate the need for a distinctively Christian political order? i) In the Old Testament, the ultimate kingship of God was not compromised by the existence of a temporal human kingship. ii) The New Testament teaches that in the new dispensation, God appoints rulers for His righteous purposes (Romans 13:1-7). iii) Since all things are to be done to God’s glory, we should expect God to provide us with at least general norms for righteous rule.
c) The Old Testament theocracy may be seen as a sort of “incarnation” (Don’t press the analogy suggested by that word!): the kingdom of God existing in the form of human social institutions.
i) The theocratic statutes presuppose that paradoxical situation, and thus may not be naively applied to any other situation. ii) With the coming of the New Covenant, political institutions on earth lose their “divine nature”.
iii) Nevertheless, as a form of human government promoting social order, the statutes must be seen as the wisest ever given (Deuteronomy 4:7f.)
iv) In the Old Testament period, even pagan rulers were judged for their failure to rule righteously, righteousness being defined by the law of God. Thus, the Old Covenant norms for politics were not seen as applying exclusively to Israel (cf. Bahnsen).
v) It is inevitable, then, that we shall seek to imitate the Old Covenant theocracy in developing a Christian politics, somewhat as we seek to imitate the righteousness of the incarnate Christ.
vi) Imitation of Old Testament Israel, like imitation of Christ, is fraught with peril. We will often be tempted to claim for ourselves what was unique to the theocracy. On the other hand, we may dismiss as unique to the theocracy something that God wants us to observe. The job is difficult.
d) Problem Areas.
i) Sabbatical years and the Jubilee
(4) If limited to Israel, how may we in the present situation emulate the equity provided by these laws? ii) Tithe structure. iii) Penalty structure (same problems).
e) Summary: I’m straddling the fence on this issue. I hope I can resolve it some in my own mind because it is crucial in determining our social and political responsibility. In general, however, I would say that the burden of proof is on those who would deny the relevance of some civil statute to our time.
7. The Love Commandment and Other Commandments Note: more will be said about the nature of love under the existential perspective. Our present purpose is to sketch the relation between the love-command and the
other commands. By “love commandment,” we mean the commandment to love God and, thus implicitly and on that basis, the command to love one another.
a. Prominence of the Love Commandment.
i. Love as the covenant allegiance owed by a vassal to he suzerain.
ii. Prominence of love (= exclusive covenant loyalty) in the Decalogue. (“Thou shalt have no other gods before me.”)
iii. Prominence of love in the shema, the fundamental confession of faith of God’s Old Covenant people (Deuteronomy 6:4ff.)
vi. Emphases on love in New Covenant ethics: I Thessalonians 4:9; I Peter 1:22; Hebrews 13:1.
vii. Love as the highest Christian virtue: I Corinthians 13; I Peter 4:8.
viii.Love as fulfillment of the law: Matthew 22:37-40; parallels; Galatians 5:14, 6:2; Matthew 7:12; Romans 13:8ff.
i. Schleiermacher: law is concerned only with the outward at. Therefore, the love commandment is not a commandment at all.
ii. Brunner, Bonhoeffer: Since God’s will for me is always absolutely concrete, law can be only a general guide. Knowledge of God’s will comes about in a momentary inspiration in a situation.
iii. J. Fletcher, Situation Ethics: There are no rules. Laws are general guidelines, maxims, but none is absolute. Ultimately, we must simply do what is the most loving thing in a particular situation.
a) Contradiction: Fletcher renounces rules (irrationalism) but sets forth his own rule (do what is loving in a situation) as absolute (rationalism). (His attempt to show that his rule is not a rule in unconvincing.)
b) Fletcher’s rule lacks all content, and, thus, can give no moral guidance.
c) Fletcher’s notion of love is unbiblical. He denies the biblical
relationship between love and the other commandments.
d) Implementing the norm of love faces the same difficulties as
implementing the principle of utility. e) Thus, Fletcher’s arguments (often dogmatic assertions) about what love requires are supremely unconvincing.
a. Every legal obligation (in human or divine law) is essentially obligation to a legal system. That system includes not only specific precepts, but also broader principles, judicial arrangements for applying the law, executive arrangements for enforcing it, etc. The system as a whole determines what use is to be made of any part of it.
i. We tend to think of obedience as instant response to divine commands: biblical pictures of Abraham, Jesus, and others reinforce this picture.
ii. Thus, sermons often suggest that we ought to drop whatever we are doing and do what the sermon calls for: persistent prayer, evangelism, pursuit of social justice, visiting the sick, feeding the poor, studying the Scripture, etc.
iii. However, we clearly cannot do all of these all of the time. We are finite, and our schedules are limited. We must frequently stop obeying one command in order to obey another. And Scripture does not assume otherwise. It assumes that some commands may not be carried out “immediately”.
vi. It should not be assumed, therefore, that one who spends ten hours a week helping the poor is necessarily more obedient than someone who spends ten hours in prayer or visiting the sick.
vii. Therefore, in addition to the general system of “priorities” set forth in the law itself [c., d. above], each individual must develop for himself, in the context of the church and obedience to the Word, a personal set of “priorities” which may be different from those of anyone else.
viii.It seems odd, even impious, to suggest that an individual may decide what emphasis he will put on various divine (absolute) commands. Yet, this is a necessary part of applying the word to a situation; and without such application, the law is a dead letter.
ix. It must not be assumed, therefore, that because God has commanded something, it must be done immediately or must be given an unlimited amount of time.
a) In some church courts, e.g., one commonly hears that since God has sanctified the truth and requires sound doctrine, questions of doctrinal orthodoxy always must take precedence over all other considerations. Thus, there are church courts that are so preoccupied with doctrinal questions (even minutiae) that they do little in the area of missions, evangelism, prayer, etc. The commandment concerning doctrinal soundness, however, must not be thought to take precedence over every other consideration in every situation.
b) Other church courts take the opposite approach: God commands evangelism, and, thus, we must be up and about the business of soul-winning, and questions of doctrine must take second place. But to assume without argument that they must is to take an irresponsible attitude.
c) The OP and PCA churches differ essentially in their customary determinations of priorities. The OPC is closer to a) above; the PCA closer to b), though both bodies are most balanced than the caricatures in a) and b) would suggest. The main problem inhibiting merger of these bodies is that neither group is willing to question seriously its own scheme of priorities or to acknowledge the difficulty and subtlety of the question involved. Each group tends simply to assume that its own scale of priorities is right and then to measure the other group in terms of that scale.
II. Christian Ethics: The Situational Perspective (Christian Teleological or Situational Ethics). In the normative perspective, we asked “What is our duty?” Here, the ethical question is, “How must I change the world in order to accomplish God’s purposes?
A. The Situation and Our Knowledge of Our Duty.
1. Recall what was said earlier about God’s character and acts as ethical revelation.
2. Functions of the situation in making moral decisions.
3. Means-end relationships (teleology).
4. Casuistry.
i. Pharisaism: The law is in effect replaced or even contradicted by casuistic interpretations, “. . . making the word of God of none effect by tradition.”
ii. False applications were often made normative in the church.
iii. Casuistry as rationalization of sin: (“lax” interpretations). In Rabbinical Judaism and later Roman Catholic casuistry, there was a tendency to polarities between more “lax” and more “rigorous” schools: Shammai vs. Hillel, Jansenists vs. Jesuits, etc.
a) Principle that a wrong action can be justified because it is more right than its opposite. b) Too easily determining exceptions to general commands. c) Too easily claiming implicit qualifications to commands. d) Principle that a normally sinful action can be excused if done for a good motive.
iv. Casuistry as a burdensome yoke (“rigorous” interpretations): a) Vast catalogue of restrictions added to God’s word. b) Leaves little room for freedom of the believer, individual
responsibility. c) Encourages a nit-picking mentality, interest in minutiae as over against the “weightier” matters. d) Questions the perspicuity of revelation by making morality a matter for experts to decide. e) Promotes overconfidence in the interpreter’s own ability to interpret Scripture and situation. Are we really sure that we “understood” the Viet Nam war? f) Encourages works-righteousness.
e. Ways to guard against such abuse.
i. Firm, practical confidence in the gospel of justification by grace through faith in the finished work of Christ.
ii. Firm, practical confidence in Scripture as the clear and sufficient word of God.
iii. Perspective: Awareness of what is more or less important within Scripture itself, and among its applications (“priorities”).
5. Summary: A biblical understanding of our situation will tell us our duty. If we understand the ends and means of the created order, we will know what to do. This is a Christian “situational” or “teleological” ethic. However, it presupposes and involves all we said earlier about the norm.
B. The Ethical Situation (environment).
Since we must take our situation into account when we make ethical choices, it is important that we learn to describe that situation in a biblical way.
1. God Himself: God is the original environment from which all else comes, and in whom we liven and move and have our being. Recall the “Lordship attributes,” control, authority and presence [Part I: I.C]. It is the fact of God, which must, above all, be taken account of in our ethical decisions.
a. His Decree.
i. Since God by His decree foreordains everything that comes to pass, all means/end relationships are part of his all-wise plan. We can trust that the means he approves will be effective and that the end he announces will surely come to pass. Hence, the persuasiveness of the “natural law” idea. God’s commands are consistent with creation. I would not say that the former are “grounded in” the latter, for the opposite conception is equally legitimate.
ii. Thus, the situational and normative perspectives are consistent. What God tells us in His word will surely take place in the world. Obeying the law is the best way to get along in the world.
iii. Does our environment ever force us into making a sinful choice? (“Conflict of duties,” “tragic moral choice”.) a) There are many apparent examples of this: cf.
i) Must we not, in some situations, tell lies in order to preserve life? In World War II, many fought moral battles over the question of whether they should answer truly when asked if they were hiding Jews.
ii) Women in concentration camps were sometimes lured into adulterous relationships on the promise that cooperation would save the lives of their loved ones.
iii) Biblical examples: cf. Murray 123ff., Kline “The Intrusion”.
b) It appears that in these examples one cannot keep one commandment without breaking another. This is because the situation has become so distorted by sin that no perfectly righteous choice is possible.
c) Such an analysis must, however, be rejected: i) The character of God.
ii) The character of sin: Sin always presupposes that there is something right that ought to be done, and that man knows what that is. Note Romans 1-2, other biblical condemnations of sin. If there were “tragic choices,” there would, in those cases, be no clearly right alternative, and, therefore, no way of knowing that alternative.
iii) The character of the law:
iv) The character of Christ:
are.” (Hebrews 4:15). I.e., if Jesus did not face decisions of this most difficult type, then he can hardly be said to have participated in the moral agony of our fallen world.
v) I Corinthians 10:13—A promise particularly given to believers, but reflecting the general view of moral life summarized above. d) Why the theory is plausible.
i) It is easy enough, when writing an ethics text, to concoct an example where all “ways of escape” from sin are ruled out. But are there cases like that in the real world? Be careful of forming your picture of the ethical life on the basis of hypothetical examples taken from ethics textbooks.
ii) Some of the plausibility of this theory comes, however, from the undeniable fact that moral choice is often very difficult. Often, it is not easy to find the “way of escape.” In rejecting the concept of “tragic moral choice,” do not fall to the other extreme of oversimplifying ethical problems.
iii) Some alleged examples of tragic moral choice are really questions of priority within the divine law. [Cf. I.D.11.]. It is at least arguable, e.g., that the command to preserve life overrides the command to tell the truth in some cases.
iv) Some moral situations are particularly difficult because they involve a choice between two evils. When trying to save lives on a battlefield, we may have to choose between allowing one man or another to die, in order to have time and resources to save others. This seems like a “tragic choice” in the above sense. Note well, however: It is a choice between two evils, not a choice between two wrongs. Either choice we make will bring harm to someone, and that is, in one sense, evil, even “tragic” in a general sense. But it cannot be shown that all possible choices in that situation will displease the Lord.
iv. Foreordination, freedom, responsibility. a) It has often been thought that if man is to be responsible for his actions, he must be able to act independently of God’s decree. i) Recall autexousion (free will) in many church fathers. ii) Thomas Aquinas: God moves man’s will toward the universal good; else man would not be able to will anything. However, man determines himself, by his reason, to will this or that (which may be a true or only apparent good).
iii) Arminianism. iv) Secular philosophers: Descartes, Kant, Existentialism, some British writers such as H. D. Lewis and C.A. Campbell.
(1) Lewis and Campbell deny not only divine foreordination; they also deny that our choices are determined at all by past choices or character.
(2) Other secular philosophers the same. b) The central argument: “ought” implies “can”. i) It is generally assumed in law that a person can be blamed for something only if he was able to avoid doing it. If, e.g., someone is judged insane, he may be acquitted of blame, since, presumably, he “could not avoid” doing what he did. ii) Scripture, then, is also invoked to support this principle. c) Comments:
i) It is true that in Scripture moral responsibility presupposes certain kinds of “ability”.
ii) Other kinds of ability, however, are not presupposed by the
Scriptural concept of responsibility.
(4) The power to establish our own moral standards (cf. Sartre). iii) To suppose that any of the abilities under ii) are required for morality is to adopt a non-biblical set of moral presuppositions. Thus, the basic question is a question of morality, not merely of metaphysics or anthropology.
iv) “Free will” in the Arminian sense is actually destructive of responsibility.
v) The Problem of Evil: See Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God; Doctrine of God.
i. Before the Fall: God was Lord and Friend to man; Control, Authority, Presence.
ii. After the Fall: a) God appears to judge sin. His hostility toward sin continues even in the present period. Thus, we make our ethical decisions with the wrath
of God in view (Ephesians 5:6; Colossians 3:6). b) He gives the redemptive promise—the basis of ethical hope.
iii. With the patriarchs and Israel: covenant solidarity. “I will be with you,” Exodus 3:12; Cf. Deuteronomy 7:6ff., etc. Because we are his, because he has drawn us to himself, therefore we are to be holy, set apart for him.
iv. Incarnation to Pentecost:
a) The kingdom has come—the righteousness of God on earth.
b) We are in the kingdom, in Christ, in the “age to come.” We are
children of light. Thus, we are able to prevail in the moral battle.
c) In Christ, we have the definitive example of righteousness.
d) Yet, we are also living in “this age”. The old and new ages overlap, and we exist simultaneously in both. Christ has won the decisive victory (“already,”) but sin continues to exercise power until the parousia (“not yet”). Thus, all ethical life involves tension. We are holy in Christ, yet disobedient servants.
v. The Parousia and Consummation: Note the various ways in which this hope is related to ethics as a purifying doctrine:
a) Since this age is to end and the things of this world are to be dissolved, the Christian ought to have a set of priorities radically different from those of the world, II Peter 3:11; cf. I Corinthians 7:26, 29.
b) Since we eagerly await that day (II Peter 3:12; I John 3:3), we will anticipate it even now by purifying ourselves as he is pure. Thus even now, we are part of the new age, not of the old (Galatians 1:4; Romans 12:2)
c) Since the Resurrection of Christ has decisively established the new age, we are confident that our labors for his kingdom will not be in vain, but will inevitably prevail, I Corinthians 15:58.
d) We look to the parousia as our deliverance from tribulation, and thus as a source of hope in tribulation, Luke 21:28, parallels.
e) Knowing that Christ is coming, but not knowing the day and hour, we must always be ready to meet him, Matthew 24:44; I Thessalonians 5:1-10; I Peter 1:7; II Peter 3:14.
f) Rewards also serve as motivation, Romans 14:10; II Corinthians 5:10; I Corinthians 3:8ff., 9:17f., 25; Colossians 3:23-25; Ephesians 6:7f., II Timothy 4:8; I Peter 5:4; James 1:12; Psalm 19:11; Matthew 5:12, 46, 6:1ff., 10:41f., parallels; II John 8; Revelation 11:18.
i) This teaching is not works righteousness or salvation by merit.
ii) Paradoxically, however, there are also degrees of reward, and these have some positive correlation to our faithfulness [passages under f)].
iii) Note the correlation between our own ultimate self-interest and the fulfillment of God’s purposes. [Cf. below on the goal.] There is no antagonism between these in Christian ethics.
vi. Notice, then, how our ethical decisions must take account of past, present, and future events.
2. The Angels.
In a surprising number of passages, Scripture teaches us to take our angelic “environment” into account when making ethical decisions.
a. The doctrine of angels rebukes the smallness of our cosmology.
i. The modern cosmology leaves little room for angels. a) In one sense, it is relatively easy for modern man to deal with God: He makes God so utterly transcendent that his existence is irrelevant to the world.
b) Angels, however, cannot easily be eliminated by the transcendence route.
ii. Though the modern cosmology is often said to be much broader than the biblical one, much larger, it is actually smaller in its view of rational beings. The modern view sees man as the only rational being on earth and the vast reaches of space (save some enclaves on other planets) as devoid of intelligent life. In Scripture, however, the universe is filled with great multitudes—legions—of angels. Thus:
iii. Scripture teaches that the visible world is only a small part of God’s kingdom, only a small part of the intelligent life of the universe. II Kings
6:17 teaches us that we need a larger perspective than the visible word
affords.
a) Our spiritual struggles are part of a much larger warfare.
b) The warfare is in one sense far bigger and more complicated than we would ever suppose apart from revelation.
iv. The doctrine of angels also emphasizes the personal character of God’s providence. Not only is the world governed by a divine person, but that divine person typically works, not through impersonal “law structures,” but through personal agents. This is important, for impersonal determinism militates against ethical responsibility. God does not press buttons—not often at least; rather, he sends messengers.
b. The doctrine of angels shows us something of the dimensions of our ethical warfare.
i. Angels participate in the kingdom warfare. a) Bad angels—Satan and his hosts—tempters, accusers, etc. b) Good angels—ministering spirits for us (Hebrews 1:14). c) The fight one another, as well as against and for us (Daniel 10:13, 21;
Jude 9; Revelation 12:7). d) Thus, Scripture urges us not to underestimate the difficulty of the struggle, as if we could succeed with human resources alone, Ephesians 6. Not only are men involved, but also beings which are terribly strong, intelligent, numerous, and, to us, exceedingly mysterious. e) On the other hand, we ought not to overestimate the difficulty either; for there are angels fighting on our side, II Kings 6:15-17. f) The main point: Do not base your hopes or fears merely upon the empirical situation. The really decisive issues in life are religious and ethical, even if “experience” suggests otherwise; for it is our religious and ethical equipment alone that will prevail over the hosts of evil. Use the armor of God!
ii. Angels are witnesses to human salvation. Luke 12:8f., 15:10; I Corinthians 4:9; Ephesians 3:10; I Timothy 3:16; I Peter 1:12; Revelation 14:10.
a) Although in one sense angels participate in the redemptive drama, there is another sense in which they are spectators rather than participants. Redemption does not extend to them. Unfallen angels need no redemption, and fallen angels receive none (cf. Hebrews 2:16).
b) Thus, the angels are somewhat bewildered by the process of redemption. They are amazed at what God has done for humanity.
c) Remarkably enough, they learn the redemptive wisdom of God through the church, Ephesians 3:10! It is our privilege to teach angels by our words and life! (Consider this as an ethical motivation.)
d) Beyond this, the angels also serve as “witnesses” in a more official sense (Luke 12:8f., etc.).
iii. The doctrine of angels is a measure of the greatness of our salvation in Christ; for that salvation lifts us above the angels.
a) According to Hebrews 2:9, Jesus was made a little (or “for a little while;” the temporal expression brachu is used) lower than the angels for the suffering of death. He is then again exalted above them.
b) The passage implies that Jesus’ brethren share that exaltation with him. Thus, Psalm 8 is fulfilled. Although we do not yet see everything subject to man, we see this dominion in Jesus (2:8).
c) Thus, the angels minister to us, not vice versa, Hebrews 1:14.
d) The world to come is not theirs, but ours, 2:5ff. (Cf. Paul’s odd statement that we shall judge angels, I Corinthians 6:3.)
e) Thus, angel worship is a great delusion from which Christ has set us free, Colossians 2:18f., Revelation 19:10, 22:8f.
f) Because of Christ, Satan is a defeated foe. We may resist him, and he will flee, I Peter 5:8f.; James 4:7.
g) Salvation is for man alone, God’s image, not for angels (Hebrews 2:16) [cf. ii., above].
3. The Human Environment (Social). God expects us to take our fellow human beings into account when we make moral decisions. We shall say much more about the foundations of social ethics in connection with the ethics of government (Fifth Commandment) and of sex
(Seventh). At this point, we shall restrict ourselves to some very general
observations.
i. Working out of the curse [above, b.v.]
ii. Development of “civilization” among sinful men. a) The sons of Cain, Genesis 4:17-24, developing social, cultural, governmental institutions in opposition to God. b) Genesis 6:1-5: Royal polygamy? Angel marriages? Mixed marriages? In any case, a breakdown in the divinely ordained social structure. c) Genesis 11:1ff.: Babel. Unification of the human race in disobedience to God. d) Compounding of evil through cultural developments; Sodom and Gomorrah, Canaan, etc. Sinful practices reinforced by unified cultural tradition, rationalized, accepted easily by individuals.
e) Principles of evil incarnate in governmental, ecclesiastical forms: Daniel, Revelation.
d. The Corporate Character of Redemption.
i. The first redemptive promise, like the cultural mandate, concerns land and seed (Genesis 3:16-19): In toil, we will live off the land until the seed of promise defeats the enemy. Like the cultural mandate, these promises concern humanity as a body. The toil over the land is a common task, and the seed presupposes reproduction and family.
ii. God redeems, not merely individuals, but “a people”. a) Sethites / Cainites, Noah’s family, Shem / Ham and Japheth, Peleg / Joktan (Genesis 10:25?), Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Christ.
b) The promise “to you and to your children”—family units brought into the kingdom. Circumcision and baptism.
iii. Redeeming a people implies that the people is united by common
structures. Thus, redemption involves the development of a new
civilization, new social institutions.
a) Prophetic, priestly, kingly institutions.
b) Family, church, state.
c) New Covenant: Christ as king, apostles, prophets, pastor-teachers,
elders, deacons, each believer using his gifts to serve the body. d) The consummation: not only new heavens and new earth, but New Jerusalem as well—new city, new social order.
i. God intended for us to help one another in our common task, not to try to do everything alone. Thus, we are to seek help and guidance from those equipped to give it.
ii. Because of sin, however, other people are not only helpers, but tempters as well. Thus, the need of vigilance, testing, proving as well as trusting.
iii. Such temptation, sinful influence, is compounded by the development of unregenerate social institutions.
vi. We must not only expect help from one another, but must above all seek to help one another—the love-command. In all our decisions, we must consider the needs of others above our own.
vii. The great events of our time must be addressed by the Word. This involves Christian analysis of social and political issues. Such social critique is itself a corporate task. Many ministers do not have the training to carry out such analysis knowledgeably. The ministry needs help from many Christians trained in many fields.
4. The Human Environment (Individual).
i. Besides being members of groups and institutions, we are each unique— different in some way from every other human being.
ii. This uniqueness begins in the creative mind of God and exists from conception.
iii. Each of us has unique heredity, environment, abilities, strengths, weaknesses.
vi. Each of us has, in some degree, a unique role in the kingdom of God—a unique calling, unique gifts and opportunities.
vii. Each of us has, in some sense, a unique spiritual battle. True, the temptations we face are “common to man” (I Corinthians 10:13); but they do not take identical form in every individual case. All of us are tempted to steal, but in different ways: Some are tempted to steal from individuals, others “only” from corporations or government, others from the honor due to God.
viii.Each of us has, in some measure, unique moral responsibilities stemming from his particular calling. (The pastor of Covenant PCA, Winter Park, is obligated to preach there regularly; I am not.) These arise out of applications of the Word to our unique situations.
d. Moral decisions, then, must take into account both the likenesses and the differences between ourselves and other persons (particularly other Christians).
i. We must each apply the word to his unique situation. Though we can and must seek help from others in this, no one else can do it for us. Even in applying the advice of others, an individual judgment must be made.
ii. We must each seek to overcome his unique temptations through the means of grace, realizing that our temptations are not, at the most basic level, different from those all men experience (I Corinthians 10:13) or, specifically, different from those which Christ experienced as a man (Hebrews 4:15).
5. The Natural Environment.
i. The earth resists man’s dominion.
ii. It is a source of distress (“toil”), weariness.
iii. Though all things are good, even after the fall (I Timothy 4:4; cf. Genesis 1:31, I Corinthians 10:26), man’s lust finds in things a source of temptation, as with the fruit in the fall narrative itself.
iv. Events in the natural world serve as means of divine judgment, chastening, deliverance. a) The plagues of Egypt.
b) Job’s sufferings.
c) The Flood, etc.
i. From the beginning, man was expected to apply God’s word to his natural environment. a) Cultural mandate: How do we use each thing to God’s glory and to fulfill our task? b) Naming of animals. c) Abstaining from the forbidden fruit.
d) “Keeping” and “cultivating” the garden, Genesis 2:15. I.e., Adam’s task is not merely t dominate, but also to maintain and improve his natural environment. Conservation is not, of course, opposite to subduing and replenishing, but necessary to them.
ii. Since the fall, we must reckon with nature as an occasion for suffering, frustration, sin.
iii. Yet even now, we live by the ground (Genesis 3:17ff.) and, thus, must continue to cultivate and subdue it.
iv. Anticipation of physical resurrection in the new creation-purifying doctrine.
C. The Goal of Christian Ethics. Since Christian ethics is, from the situational perspective, a matter of determining the best godly means of achieving God’s purposes, it is important for us to try to define
in general what those purposes are. What goal or goals ought we to be seeking in moral decisions?
1. The Doctrine of the Two-fold End.
a. Some church fathers, perhaps under Gnostic influence or due to misreading of Scripture, denigrated the physical world, favoring an ascetic withdrawal from
the world as the highest form of Christian morality (Tatian, Clement of
Alexandria, Tertullian, Jerome).
b. Augustine.
i. More positive, world-affirming view of the state, marriage, property. These are not evil in themselves.
ii. Earthly life, however, is but a pilgrimage to the hereafter. The supreme goal of human life is our union with God in the vision of God in heaven.
iii. Earthly pursuits, therefore, though not sinful in themselves, can distract us from our heavenly goal.
a) Private property is legitimate; the rich and poor alike can be saved by God’s grace. But possessions are a hindrance to the soul, and, thus, poverty is preferable. If we cannot abstain from possessions, let us at least seek to avoid the love of possessions.
b) Marriage is a sacrament and therefore good, but sex always involves desire (in this age), and desire is evil. Therefore, celibacy is higher than marriage.
c) The state promotes justice and happiness in the world. Yet in this fallen world, it is based on self-love, contempt of God. Thus, it must be subordinate to the church.
d) Even good works are always tinged by sin.
counter to the biblical emphasis upon involvement in the affairs and needs of the creation.
c. Thomas Aquinas.
i. Man’s highest good: Contemplation and love of God, bringing likeness to God and realization of the true self.
ii. In its highest form, the beatific vision, this is possible only in the life to come.
iii. Through reason, leading us to habits of virtue, we can attain an incomplete happiness in this life.
love of man. b) The practical life is therefore less meritorious. c) The contemplative life is more free from the senses and bodily organs.
vi. Consilia Evangelica (evangelical counsels). a) The safest, quickest way to blessedness is the monastic life, the life of poverty, chastity, obedience.
b) These cannot be commanded, for they are not for everybody. Yet for those capable of it, this is the way to the highest perfection.
vii. Comments: a) Like Augustine, Aquinas presents us with an essentially otherworldly ethic, based on biblical warnings about the temptations of earthly life
and the kingdom of God as the highest good.
b) Aquinas is subject to the same criticisms as Augustine in these matters.
c) Aquinas compounds the problems which Augustine had.
i) With a lower view of the effects of sin. He sees man without grace as capable of goodness at a certain level, but needing grace to achieve the highest goal.
ii) By dividing Christians into various groups who have essentially different obligations. One group has a “higher” morality than the other, even though the other group is not guilty of sin on that account. There is no biblical support for this notion.
d. Lessons.
i. It is important to maintain that all men have the same “chief end”. Much mischief has been done. a) By allowing the legitimacy of non-Christian ends as having natural but not supernatural validity.
b) By claiming that different groups of Christians may properly seek different ethical goals.
ii. Formulation of the goal must be based upon Scripture, not on plausible generalizations about the physical and spiritual, the civil and ecclesiastical, the married vs. the celibate life, etc.
2. The Overall Goal: Biblical Formulations Westminster Shorter Catechism, Question #1: “What is the chief end of man? Man’s chief end is to glorify God, and to enjoy him forever.”
i. Scripture data: a) Law as delight of the redeemed heart, Psalm 1, 119:97; Romans 7:22. b) Law as gift of grace, Psalm 119:29. c) Law as way of life, Leviticus 18:5; Deuteronomy 5:33, 8:3, 11:13-15,
28:1-4, 30:11-20. Obedience is the road to covenant blessing. d) Law given for our good, Deuteronomy 10:12f; cf. 4:40, 12:28. e) Rewards as motivation for obedience: [cf. above, II.B.1.c.v.f)]
ii. An “anthropocentric” formulation? Yes, in a way. But remember that it is God who is to be enjoyed, and indeed God in contrast with the lusts of our own hearts.
iii. Consistency with the first formulation: God is glorified by the realization of redeemed human life. He does not demand the annihilation of man, but rather obedience to him brings the highest happiness. There is no need to draw sharp opposition between “happiness” and “duty” as in much non-Christian philosophy.
iv. Scripture does condemn selfishness and preoccupation with one’s own comfort and pleasure, demanding self-sacrifice and even the endurance of hardship and persecution. But this is presented as the road to the most enduring forms of happiness: Matthew 5:24-34, 10:16-42, etc.
a) The passages which most graphically describe the rigors, the difficulties of the Christian life, characteristically also emphasizes its rewards.
b) In contrast, the pleasures of sin are characterized as fleeting and vain. Even the pursuit of the good things of this earth is vain outside the context of God’s overall purpose (Ecclesiastes).
c. The Kingdom of God as Man’s Summum Bonum (Van Til).
i. Biblical emphases a) Qualifications for entering the kingdom are ethical, but conferred by grace.
b) Seeking the kingdom involves seeking God’s righteousness, therefore, at all levels. Cf. Matthew 6:10.
c) Thus, “seeking the kingdom” is that supreme purpose which takes precedence over all others, Matthew 6:33. Cf. Matthew 25:34.
ii. Relation to other formulations: a) Combines theocentric, anthropocentric emphases. Matthew 6:33 teaches that as we seek to glorify God, we will find our own happiness. b) Brings out the key factor of historical development: The goal of ethics is the implementation of a particular historical program, not merely of general norms.
c) This specific program shows concretely how the glory of God is related to our happiness.
iii. Summary: The Goal of ethics is the fulfillment of the total covenant relationship between God and man. We seek to advance the purposes of that covenant, that kingdom program.
3. More Specific Goals.
Commission is an application of the cultural mandate to the post-fall situation, and within that situation, has “priority” in some, but not all, senses.
i. The redemptive promise takes the form of the Cultural Mandate. a) The Cultural Mandate (Genesis 1:28ff.) has two basic elements, the subduing and the replenishing of the earth, corresponding to the creation ordinances of labor and marriage. (The consecration of these
activities to God is reflected in the Sabbath ordinance.) b) The curse again brings these two elements into view. Childbearing
(3:16) and labor (3:17ff.) are the aspects of human life singled out for special mention.
c) The Protevangelium (3:15ff.) also mentions these functions specifically. They are not only cursed, but are instruments of redemption.
i) Though childbearing will be painful, it will, in time, yield a redeemer. ii) Though labor will be toilsome, nevertheless, it will sustain physical life so that the line of the promised seed will be preserved. d) The post-Adamic covenants promise land and seed. i) Noah: His family is to be saved, and the land will be preserved from further destruction by flood. His sons will live and be subject
to curses and blessings. Note especially the renewal of the Cultural Mandate, Genesis 9:7. ii) Abraham: The seed of the promise and the land of Canaan. iii) Moses: The Abrahamic promise renewed. iv) David: Seed and territorial dominion combined in the concept of kingship and the promise of a continuing Davidic throne.
v) Christ: Rules (Matthew 28:18, etc.), fills (Ephesians 1:23, 4:10) all things. Rule and filling by Christ are present realities, but they also have an aspect yet to be fulfilled, I Corinthians 15:24ff., Philippians 3:21.
e) Redemption, therefore, is a particular kind of “subduing” and “replenishing”. i) It is the subduing of sin and of the enemies of God, and of the curse which these have brought upon the earth.
ii) It is the filling of all things with the redemptive presence of God in Christ, through the Spirit. More specifically, it is the creation of a new race of people (I Peter 2:9) with their children (Acts 2:39) who are to carry the knowledge of God throughout the earth (Matthew 28:19f.). Thus “the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord as the waters cover the sea,” (Isaiah 11:9).
ii. After the fall, the goal of ethics is always presented in specifically redemptive terms.
a) “To him (Jesus), the kingdom exists there, where not merely God is supreme, for that is true at all times and under all circumstances, but where God supernaturally carries through his supremacy against all opposing powers and brings man to the willing recognition of the same.” Vos, The Kingdom and the Church, p. 50.
i) Note: The kingdom is not mere rule, but redemptive rule; not mere filling of the earth, but filling the earth with faithful kingdom subjects.
ii) Scriptural basis: The kingdom as the righteousness of God on earth [above, 2.c.]. b) I Corinthians 9, 10. i) Paul, here, speaks of the goals of his ministry, specifically the reasons why he does not use his “rights”: 9:16-27, 10:33.
(4) Note that all of these are specifically redemptive goals. ii) Paul urges us to have the same goals: 9:24, 10:31-11:1.
iii) Philippians 3:4-17.
iv) Matthew 6:33.
v) Conclusion: Everything we do must be done in advance, not only God’s purposes in general, but specifically the purposes connected with his post-fall program, the purpose of redemption.
iii. To say that the goal of ethics is specifically redemptive is, in one sense, to narrow the goal, and, in another sense, not.
a) We are no longer concerned to subdue and replenish the earth apart from the redemptive significance of those acts. In that sense, our goal is “narrower” than it was before the fall.
b) On the other hand, the redemptive mandate is every bit as
comprehensive as the cultural mandate.
i) The redemptive program culminates in a New Heaven and New Earth—if anything, a more comprehensive and radical change than would have resulted from Adam’s obedience to the original mandate.
ii) Our redemptive responsibility involves all our decisions, all aspects of life.
iii) The Christian bricklayer, e.g., is responsible not only to bring out the potential from the earth to God’s glory, but in doing so to contribute to the progress of the gospel (and this is done in many ways).
iv. The Great Commission is a statement of the redemptive goal. a) Note that it is not merely a command to preach the way of forgiveness in abstraction. It commands us to “make disciples” and to teach “to observe all that I commanded you.” Note the comprehensiveness here. b) The Great Commission, then, calls us to preach the gospel, but including all the implications of the gospel for all areas of life. c) Discipling and teaching are not only by word, but also by example. Cf. the notion of witness, Acts 1:8.
d) Thus, the Great Commission calls us to redemptive witness in all aspects of life.
v. Relations between Cultural Mandate and Great Commission. a) Both call for creative involvement in God’s purposes in every decision
of life. b) Both call for godly subduing and filling of the earth. c) Both call for comprehensive change in the world-system. d) The Cultural Mandate is prior in that it came first in history and
established the general structure of man’s responsibility. The Great Commission is merely a particular application of it to a sinful age. e) The Great Commission sets forth the specific concerns which must motivate our subduing and filling today. In that sense, it has priority.
i) Thus, Paul gives up his cultural rights and responsibilities (eating, drinking, marriage) to carry out his redemptive calling, I Corinthians 9.
ii) Each of us must imitate Paul insofar as our gifts and callings require.
iii) This does not mean that everyone must be a preacher. Those better equipped to do other things also carry on redemptive witness as they demonstrate the difference made by the Gospel in their work.
III. Christian Ethics: The Existential Perspective (Christian Existential or Personalist Ethics) The normative perspective asks, “What is my duty?” The situational asks, “How may I change the world in order to bring about those goals pleasing to God?” The existential perspective puts it this way: “How must I be changed, that I may please God? Or corporately, “How must we be changed, etc.?”
A. Goodness and the Being of God.
B. Goodness and the Being of Man. God intends that man as God’s image should reflect in a creaturely way this union of goodness and being, so that doing good comes “naturally”—i.e. as a normal
expression of his nature. As an aspect of the divine image, this natural goodness renders man an object of worth, deserving of respect above all creatures.
1. Creation.
2. Fall.
| c. | After the fall, man is no longer free by nature to choose the good. Yet, he is |
| free in other senses [II.B.1.a.iv.]. | |
| d. | After the fall, man is still responsible. |
| e. | Similarly, man maintains a kind of moral authority subordinate to that of God. |
| He still must “decide for himself” [above, 1.d.]; He still establishes | |
| subordinate norms [1.f.]. Although he will abuse this responsibility, the | |
| responsibility remains. | |
| f. | After the fall, man remains a unity. His sin is not the result of inevitable |
| conflict among the parts of his being; rather it is the result of willful choice. It | |
| does sometimes happen that will and intellect, or intellect and emotion, | |
| “conflict” in some sense; but such conflict simply means that fallen man | |
| wants to do what he knows is wrong. All “aspects” of man are equally | |
| affected by sin. | |
| g. | Though fallen, man is responsible to be what he was before the fall—obedient |
| from the heart, obedient by nature. Nothing less will please God. Hence the | |
| depth of the hopelessness of fallen man even trying to please God apart from | |
| grace. |
3. Redemption.
i. It involves both dependence upon God and substantial effort on our part. Sanctification is a spiritual battle. It takes vigilance, discipline, effort (contra quietism, perfectionism, Keswick, some Lutheran representations).
ii. It involves conscious obedience to God’s commands [cf. I., normative perspective] as well as spontaneous action in the Spirit.
a) Recall earlier discussion of the Lutheran Formula of Concord [I.D.3.] which finds an opposition between obeying commandments and working in the Spirit.
b) Comments: i) Such an opposition or antagonism is not found in Scripture. It is true that mere obedience to commands without a heart renewed by the Spirit is worthless; but such obedience is not true obedience either. ii) The two need not compete, for each has a distinct function in equipping us for good works. The commands tell us God’s will, and the Spirit enables us to do it. Neither can do the job of the other.
iii) It is true that, as we mature in the Lord, our obedience becomes less labored, more spontaneous, in those areas in which are becoming sanctified [cf. d., below]. We do not always need to look up chapter and verse; we know God’s law so well that it is written on the heart, and we do it simply out of gratefulness and delight. Even in such cases, however, it is the law which we obey out of gratefulness and delight.
c) It involves Christ in union with us and us in union with Him. i) Regeneration, justification, adoption, sanctification, glorification are aspects of our union with Christ (Gaffin). ii) Faith, repentance, these represent union with Christ “from our side”. We do these things because we are in Christ. They represent our reception of Christ.
d. Note ethical goodness, freedom, responsibility, authority, unity in the redeemed [cf. 1., 2., above]. The process of sanctification brings about greater and greater unity between us and the goodness of Christ which indwells us. We are light in the Lord, Ephesians 5:8, Matthew 5:14; [cf. above, I.A.]. The law is written on the heart, [I.B.2.b.]. The goal, again, is that we serve him gladly from the heart simply because we are his joyful servants; because what we want to do is to serve him in that way. The service of Christ is perfect freedom.
C. The Motive of Christian Ethics.
1. The Concept of Motive.
a. “Motive” as reason given for an action: “His motive was revenge.”
i. A norm: “He did it because he was commanded to”—normative perspective.
ii. A goal: “He did it to achieve this purpose.”—situational perspective.
iii. An inward disposition: “He did it because he was hungry.”—existential perspective. a) Overlaps the normative, since it presupposes a norm (that hunger ought to be satisfied).
b) Overlaps the situational, since it presupposes a goal (the satisfaction of hunger).
| i. | Norms [a. i.] and goals [a. ii.] do not in themselves cause actions unless |
| accompanied by an inward commitment to obey the norm or to achieve the | |
| goal [a. iii.]. | |
| ii. | Thus, motive, in the second sense, is roughly equivalent to motive in sense |
| a. |
2. The Necessity of a Right Motive (The Inwardness of Biblical Ethics).
3. Formulations of Motive.
i. Its basic character (review from Doctrine of the Holy Spirit course) a) Receiving the free gift of salvation. b) Trusting Christ as savior and Lord (involves understanding and
believing the word, Romans 4).
ii. Relation to works. a) Faith is an obedient response to a divine command,, the command to believe, and therefore is itself a good work. b) One who has faith will inevitably do good works, so that there is no
true faith without good works (James 2:14-26; Galatians 5:6). c) Thus, works are an evidence of faith (James 2, Hebrews 11). d) Faith is not a particular act which we can distinguish and isolate from
all others. It is a way of doing other things. i) Consider this model: Faith is one act, followed by other acts (“works”). We believe at one time, and that act of believing gives us the strength to do other things (good works).
A) It is like eating a candy bar and thereby getting strength to set a pole vaulting record. B) The model of the evangelistic meeting: coming forward is faith; what follows is works. ii) This model is misleading.
iii) Conclusions.
e) However, although the relation of faith to works is so close that faith involves works, faith does not justify us in virtue of its character as obedience. It justifies by virtue of its quality as trust and receiving of Christ. It justifies because it looks away from itself, even from obedience, to Christ and his salvation.
iii. The necessity and sufficiency of faith for good works.
a) Necessity, Hebrews 11:6; Romans 14:23.
b) Sufficiency, Genesis 15:6; New Testament parallels.
iv. Faith as motive. a) Exhortations to act in faith, Matthew 8:10, 9:2, 22, 17:20, 21:22, etc. b) Ethical appeal to the great realities which are the object of Christian
faith, Ephesians 4:1ff., Romans 12:1ff., etc. c) Indications that only believers are capable of doing good works. d) Inseparability of faith from good works and vice-versa (above).
i. Hope is faith directed toward the future aspect of salvation. Like faith, it is firm and sure, not tentative or wishful as the English word “hope” sometimes suggests. Romans 5:5; I Corinthians 1:7; I Timothy 1:1; Hebrews 3:6.
ii. As such, hope functions as a motive to good works. a) Specific references, Acts 23:6, parallels; Romans 5:4ff.; II Corinthians 3:12ff.; Ephesians 4:4; Colossians 1:5 (there said to motivate faith and love!), I Thessalonians 5:8, etc.
b) Ethical passages motivating obedience by presenting the
consummation of redemption [Above, II.B.1.c.v.].
g. Love
i. Prominence of the love-commandment in Scripture, c. I.D.9.
ii. Relation of the love-commandment to the rest of the law, also cf. I.D.9.
iii. Necessity and sufficiency for good works, I Corinthians 13.
iv. Basic characteristics. (Here, love of God and of one another will be treated as one—cf. I John 4:19ff.) a) Gratefulness.
i) In the covenant structure, the love-command follows and presupposes the historical prologue, in which the suzerain’s gracious deeds are set forth. Love, then, is the vassal’s grateful response to the suzerain’s benevolence.
ii) In the Old Testament structure, love is particularly Israel’s grateful response to God for his taking Israel to himself and delivering them from death.
iii) The New Testament calls us to love as God first loved us in Christ, I John 4:7-21; John 13:34f.
iv) Note, apart from use of the term “love,” the biblical emphasis on thanksgiving through offering, prayer, actions: gratefulness as “motive”. Emphasis of Heidelberg Catechism.
b) Covenant Loyalty. i) “Love” is the term used in the treaties to describe the fundamental responsibility of the vassal: to give his ultimate loyalty exclusively to his covenant Lord, to avoid any competing treaty— relationships. ii) Note this emphasis in Israel’s fundamental confession of faith, Deuteronomy 6:5ff., and in the first commandment of the Decalogue, which takes the role of a “love-command” in the Decalogue structure. iii) In the New Testament also, love is covenant loyalty. It is a commitment to Christ as the only Lord and therefore a resolution to keep (obey) him [above, I.D.9.]. Thus, it is the mark of Christians as opposed to those outside the covenant (John 13:34f., etc.). iv) As loyalty to the whole covenant institution, love binds the vassals to one another as to the suzerain. I John 4:19ff. v) Douma, “To love means to stick with your choice.” The Ten Commandments, 21. c) Comprehensive Reorientation of Life. i) Deuteronomy 6:5f. and its New Testament allusions indicate that the love of God is a loyalty that is to permeate all aspects of life, so that nothing is left unaffected by it. ii) Note the comprehensiveness of love as a way of life in I Corinthians 13, particularly its connections with all other Christian virtues. iii) It has sometimes been asked whether the concept of love undergoes change from Deuteronomy (covenantal love—a relation of loyalty and obedience) to the later Old Testament (in Hosea, a more emotional commitment, focused on marriage rather than politics as a model).
d) Imitation of God’s grace. i) Cf. imitation of God as fundamental principle of biblical ethics,
I.A.3. ii) Those who have been delivered will seek to deliver others, Deuteronomy 5:15; Matthew 18:21-35. iii) Thus, we are called to imitate specifically God’s love for us by loving one another in the same way, John 13:34f.; I John 4:7-21.
e) Imitation of the Atonement: laying down our lives for one another, I John 3:16. i) The love of God which we are to imitate is most precisely
displayed in the atonement: John 3:16, 15:13; Romans 5:8, 8:39 (in context); Ephesians 2:4f.; II Thessalonians 2:16; I John 3:16, 4:9f.; Revelation 1:5. Cf. Mark 10:45; I Peter 2:18-25; Philippians 2:1
11. ii) Involves loving the “unlovely,” since we were unlovely when
Christ loved us, Romans 5:8; Luke 14:21; Matthew 9:9-13. iii) Involves putting the interests of others above our own, Philippians
2.
f) Imitation of God’s Common Grace: love of enemies, Matthew 5:4348; Galatians 6:10; Exodus 23:4. i) Question of the Imprecatory Psalms:
A) Remember that the Psalms are communal, not merely individual songs, and that they call down the wrath of God against those who oppose that nation identified with the Kingdom of God. In our time, these are not so clearly identified, and the long-suffering of God in our age is more central.
B) Nevertheless, there are imprecations in the NT as well as the OT: Matt. 23:17ff, Acts 1:16-20, Rom. 11:9-10, Gal. 1:8ff, Rev. 6:10, 18:20. Jesus takes Psm. 69 on his lips, John 2:17, 15:25, Rom. 15:3.
C) And the OT, like the New, prohibits personal vengeance (Lev. 19:17f, Psm. 5:6, 7:4, Prov. 20:22).
D) It is not wrong, however, to call down God’s wrath on those who clearly oppose his kingdom—with the understanding that God may answer that prayer by bringing his wrath upon Jesus.
E) A proper imprecation disclaims personal vengeance. It is a prayer for the vindication of God’s name against rebels, leaving vengeance in God’s hands.
F) God has revealed that he will show vengeance to some. The imprecatory Psalms are our “Amen” to his justice.
ii) Note “priority” given to the “household of faith” in Galatians 6:10. This is like the priority of the family—everyone must provide for his own household (I Timothy 5:8) “especially”. Our brothers and sisters in Christ will naturally be closer to us than those outside— our closest friends. But this does not require any mechanical computation dividing the church’s funds into certain percentages. We are to be ready to meet the needs of those whom we can help, without asking first about national or religious allegiance, Luke 10:25-37.
g) Seeking out responsibility. i) Love is a disposition to keep the commandments of God [I.D.9.c.]. ii) Love seeks out what we can do to serve one another [above, d)-f)]. iii) Love, therefore, gives an inevitably positive thrust to the law of
God, which tends often to favor negative formulation. It is not an adequate response to the law simply to abstain from certain things. (If that were true, we could achieve sanctification by remaining in bed.) Love calls the believer to seek out ways of doing positive good, not merely of avoiding evil.
iv) We may, therefore, see Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount as an exposition of the law in light of the love-commandment.
v) Love involves a concern for justice, not only mercy or benevolence. (Response to common question of whether love as a basic principle of Christian ethics must be supplemented by justice (Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Niebuhr, Ramsey): the question assumes a sub-biblical concept of love.)
D. The New Life as a Source of Ethical Knowledge (overlap with normative
perspective). In order to know what to do, we must know God’s law (normative perspective), the situation to which the law applies (situational), and ourselves as those who apply it (existential). The redemptive transformation makes us into new creatures who are capable of applying the law as God intended.
1. The Word as God’s Presence in Blessing.
i. We can see already that there is a kind of ethical knowledge (knowing how to obey, having ethical ability) which requires the sanctifying work of the Spirit. More on this below.
ii. Ethics, therefore, can never be a merely academic discipline. It is never a matter of merely coming up with the best verbal formulation of ethical principle. Even an exhaustive catalogue to ethical principles (applications of Scripture) will not produce holiness unless the Spirit applies the word to the heart.
iii. When we go to Scripture as a means of grace, we ought to seek not only the answers to questions, but also the power of the Spirit, working in and through the word.
iv. Here, then, is another reason why all aspects of Scripture, not just the laws and ethical admonitions, are relevant to ethics. The questions, commands, prose, poetry, parables, history, etc., all serve equally as vehicles of that transforming power. Through the all, God turns our hearts to seek him.
2. Ethical Knowledge as Product of Sanctification.
That ethical knowledge which is peculiar to the Christian is inseparable from
obedience [cf. c.iii., above]. That knowledge produced by sanctification is
obedience.
a. Wisdom.
i. Essentially a skill—”knowing how,” rather than “knowing that” [Exodus 31:1-5; cf. Ryle, The Concept of Mind] (These are related, but are not the same thing.)
ii. In Scripture, it sometimes takes on an ethical character—the skill of godly living, James 3:13-17.
iii. Specifically, wisdom is often the ability to do the right thing in particular (especially in difficult) situations. Luke 21:14f.
vi. Source: redemptive covenantal communication of God’s wisdom to us by his word and Spirit: Proverbs 3:19, 8:30, 28:7-9, 30:5; Jeremiah 8:8f; Exodus 28:3, 13:3; Deuteronomy 34:9; Acts 6:3; I Corinthians 1:24, 30, 2:6-16; Colossians 2:3, 3:16; II Timothy 3:15.
vii. Note well: One cannot claim to have wisdom in this redemptive sense unless he is obedient.
i. Concept.
a) “Metaphysical” absoluteness.
b) “Epistemological” correctness.
c) “Ethical” rightness
ii. Source: God in Christ by word and Spirit.
iii. One cannot, therefore, say that he has the truth in the fullest biblical sense unless, by God’s grace, he is walking in the truth, obeying the truth.
3. Intellectual Knowledge and Ethical Knowledge.
How, then, does intellectual knowledge fit into the overall pattern of “knowledge” in the ethical-redemptive sense?
i. The unbeliever’s ethical rebellion compromises even his “intellectual” knowledge. For to know the way of blessing and willfully to forsake it is a stupid response. Cf. Doctrine of the Knowledge of God. The “intellectual knowledge” of the unbeliever is paradoxical. He knows (and thus is responsible), but in some sense does not know (because he renounces his knowledge).
ii. Since, then, the grace of God overcomes our unbelief and its consequences it overcomes even he “intellectual” weakness caused by unbelief. Thus, when Scripture speaks of knowledge in general coming through sanctifying grace (I Corinthians 8:1-4; I Timothy 1:5-11; I John 2:3-6, 911, 20-27, 4:2f., 8, 13-17, 5:2f.; John 7:17, 11:40; Ephesians 1:17f., 3:18f.), it means knowledge as a whole. God’s gift of ethical righteousness brings restoration of knowledge, even in the “intellectual” sense.
iii. Note in the above passages especially the connection between “intellectual” knowledge and love (I Corinthians 8:1-4, 13:7, 11-13; Philippians 1:10; I Timothy 1:5-11; I John 2:9-11; Ephesians 3:17f.), faith (John 11:40), obedience (I John 2:3-6, 5:2f.; John 7:17).
i) The language of living sacrifice, nonconformity to the world, transformation, renewal of the mind emphasizes he necessity of ethical change.
ii) One who is so transformed will “prove what the will of the Lord is”.
b) Philippians 1:10. i) Love produces knowledge and aisthesis (perception, discernment, sensitivity: a moral sense, we might say). ii) This sensitivity enables us to prove (dokimazein) ta diapheronta (what is important, what really matters at a particular time). iii) Here again, obedience (love) gives me a sensitivity to God’s will, to know what to do. c) Ephesians 5:8-10. i) We are light, and that inevitably involves obedience [cf. earlier discussion about God as light, I.A.10. Also the discussion of “Goodness and the Being of Man”, above, III.B.]. Note again how righteousness comes from an inward principle. ii) That obedience enables us to know God’s will, verse 10. d) Hebrews 5:11-14 (no dokimazein here, but the same idea). i) Problem: doctrinal immaturity, inability to understand Melchizedek priesthood (11).
ii) Characteristics of doctrinal maturity (14).
e) Conclusion: knowing our duty presupposes sanctification. It presupposes active involvement in the spiritual warfare. We may never suppose that knowledge of our duty always comes before obedience, as though we could spend three years studying God’s will and then do it. Learning and doing God’s will are simultaneous.
vi. Some principles implicit in these passages. (The above teachings are rather hard to understand in the context of our intellectualistic heritage. The following comments may help us to understand why Scripture presents the matter as it does.)
a) The intellect is part of life. Its health depends on the health of the whole organism. Intellectual acts are acts of the whole person, and like all other acts, they are subject to sin and sanctification. Sanctification in one area of life begets sanctification in others. Thus, it is not surprising that in some senses obedience is prior to intellectual understanding. Cf. John 3:3.
b) Thinking presupposes the ability to think; “knowing that” presupposes “knowing how”. “Knowing how” involves obedience to a norm, i.e., doing right.
c) What does it mean to “have a concept” of something? Well, when we test people to see if they have the right “concept” of, say, a triangle, we find out what they can do. “Having a concept” always involves being able to do certain things. It is a disposition to action. Such dispositions to action are ethically directed—directed toward a particular goal which is either godly or sinful. Thus, concept presupposes disposition to act, which, in turn, presupposes ethical dispositions. (For a Christian” to have a “right concept” of God implies being ready to endure hardship for the sake of Christ. Concepts can take a long time to acquire. Compare the apostle Paul saying “We are more than conquerors” with a Sunday School class of five-yearolds saying the verse).
d) Knowing our duty involves application of Scripture to situations [I., II.], and that, in turn, involves a particular kind of moral vision.
i) Ethical judgments involve seeing our situations “in the light of” biblical categories. We ask, “Is this act murder?” “Is this act stealing?” etc. We want to call our experiences by their biblical names.
ii) The text itself does not perform this job. Scripture does not mention each of our experiences specifically. Categorizing our experiences under biblical rubrics, then, is something that we must do, by God’s enabling.
iii) This moral task involves:
iv) This moral discernment is not simply a matter of sense-experience.
v) This discernment presupposes spiritual maturity. A mature Christian can do it better than an immature one. And this maturity is not necessarily equivalent to intelligence or education. Often, uneducated Christians will be among the wisest in noting the patterns and analogies.
vi) The discernment can come about in unexpected ways.
vii) Thus, ethical discourse is never merely a matter of setting forth facts and verses.
e) The “Doctrine of Guidance”. i) Two Extremes.
ii) Both these views think that ethical knowledge is essentially a matter of acquiring propositional information. If we have an ethical problem, we merely need to know more facts.
iii) They tend to ignore:
iv) Thus, guidance does not add to Scripture; but on the other hand, it is far from an academic or impersonal process. The believer is guided in a very personal, we might even say direct, manner. Often, his workings are mysterious, perhaps even mystical in some sense.
vii. Conclusion: The ethical is in some senses prior to the intellectual. If “life is built on doctrine,” doctrine being understood as intellectual understanding of propositional revelation, then it is also true that doctrine is built on life in various ways. There is a reciprocity between the two. Neither functions without the other.
4. The Organs of Ethical Knowledge.
a. The Heart.
i. The “work of the law” written on the heart (Romans 2:15): all of us know by nature the law of God in its fundamental demands. Even under sin, man’s own nature is revelational of God and of God’s will. [Cf. I.B.2.b.].
ii. The word “written on the heart” of the regenerate [Jeremiah 31:33ff.; cf. I.B.2.b.]. This is a more profound relation between the word and our being than that described in i. If the word is written on the heart, then, we not only know God’s requirements, but we obey them by nature. Thus, the regenerate heart is naturally inclined to do God’s will.
iii. The heart convicting us of sin, II Samuel 24:10.
vi. On the other hand, if man as a whole is an organ of knowledge, then all aspects of man are involved, somehow in ethical knowledge. Thus, there is some value in making distinctions within man to see in more detail how the knowledge functions.
b. Synteresis (or synderesis).
i. In Thomas Aquinas, synteresis is reason as the faculty by which the first principles of morality are known.
ii. These cannot be derived from anything more ultimate, but are a “habit” of the soul.
iii. As such, they form the major premises of ethical syllogisms (“All stealing is wrong,” etc.).
c. Conscience.
i. In Thomas Aquinas, much moral theology. a) Take the moral syllogism, “All stealing is wrong; embezzling is stealing; therefore, embezzling is wrong.” As we saw above, the first
premise is supplied by synteresis. b) The second premise is supplied by “an inferior kind of reason”. c) Conscience (syneidesis) draws the conclusion, embezzling is wrong.
Thus, conscience is essentially a syllogistic rational process, though Thomas agrees that the term “conscience” may also be applied to synteresis.
ii. In Scripture.” a) “Conscience” (syneidesis) in the New Testament is used in ways roughly parallel to some Old Testament uses of “heart”. The word “conscience” is not found in the English Old Testament (KJV), but there are places where it is a possible translation of “heart”. Cf. II Samuel 24:10 with New Testament references. We would be inclined to say that David’s “conscience” smote him. This suggests that conscience is our inmost being, conceived as a means of ethical knowledge. b) Conscience is not the law, or the work of the law [a.i. and a.ii., above]; rather, conscience bears witness to these revelations of God (Romans 2:15, cf. Murray’s commentary). It is, therefore, not autonomous, but rests upon the revelation of God. c) Conscience is, therefore, a source of ethical knowledge: Acts 23:1, 24:16; Romans 9:1, 13:5; I Corinthians 8:7-12, 10:25-29 in context; I Timothy 1:5.
d) There is no Scriptural reason to restrict the work of conscience to the work of deriving conclusions from ethical premises. i) Conscience is certainly that which perceives the revelation and
attests its truth. ii) Conscience convicts us of sin [above examples].
iii) Conscience is certainly involved in the perception of patterns and analogies [above, 3.] whereby we derive the minor premises of moral syllogisms (“Embezzling is stealing,” e.g.).
e) Sin infects even the conscience, I Corinthians 8:7, 12; I Timothy 4:2; Titus 1:15. Cf. the expression “good conscience” or “pure conscience”. Sometimes, however, these expressions refer not to the sin or goodness of the conscience itself, but to the sin or goodness of the person, to which the conscience testifies.
i) Therefore, conscience is not infallible. If “seared,” it can fail to do its work of bringing sin to our attention.
ii) There is some paradox here. On the one hand, conscience sometimes fails; on the other hand, no one is ever without sufficient knowledge of God’s will to be responsible for sin. We ought to assume, then, that conscience is never entirely destroyed in the sinner. (Cf. the problems about the sinner’s having “knowledge” and having the “image of God”.)
f) It is always wrong to disobey conscience, even when conscience errs, I Corinthians 8:7, 10, 12 in context. To disobey conscience is, by definition, to do what we think is wrong. And doing what we think is wrong always involves a spirit of rebelliousness against God.
g) It is not, however, always right to obey conscience. Obeying conscience is right only when conscience itself is right.
h) Thus, we have a duty to train the conscience. The conscience must be sensitized by Scripture and the Spirit so that it becomes a more reliable guide.
i. Scripture does not discuss “the emotions” as an independent item of concern, any more than it discusses “the intellect” or “the will” in such a way.
ii. Yet, it speaks a great deal concerning particular emotions—griefs, joys, anxieties, awe, terror, woe, lust, and also about concepts which have a large emotional component: love, hate, happiness, etc.
iii. According to Scripture, regeneration reorients our emotional life. a) We learn to love God and hate evil, to rejoice in the good, to be content in the face of difficulty, etc.—the opposite of the unbelieving emotional disposition. b) Regeneration does not necessarily make us more emotional or less emotional. We may assume that in this respect believers differ from one another. Yet, our emotional life, however active it may be, is now the Lord’s. Thus, our joys, sorrows, etc., are different from what they were.
c) As there is a change in our emotions by grace, so there is a command to work out this new principle (gift and task, “already” and “not-yet”). i) It is sometimes said that feelings cannot be commanded, or even
taught. Hegel (Early Theological Writings) thought that Christianity was even more reprehensibly authoritarian than Judaism, because while Judaism commanded actions, Christianity commanded feelings.
ii) Scripture, however, assumes that feelings ought to be changed to conform to God’s will, and that they can be changed, by thought and by new habits.
d) Scripture teaches about the emotions, not only by commanding us to change them, but also by: i) Presenting sin in its true ugliness (contra Eve, Genesis 3:6). ii) Presenting the new life as something beautiful and delightful (rationale for emotive sermons).
iv. Emotions and knowledge. a) Emotions, like reason, have a “hermeneutical” component; i.e. they assign (or discover) meaning in various data which they express. Anger, fear, and delight represent certain assessments of the meaning of the facts at which one is angry, fearful, or delighted. b) It may be said, therefore, that the emotions presuppose, or ought to presuppose, reason; for our feelings ought to be based on true assessments of meaning, and a true assessment is a rational assessment. c) The opposite, however, is also true. Reasoning presupposes emotions. Illustration: writing a book review is a highly “rational,” even “academic” or “theoretical” activity. Yet, it is a job that requires a subtle interplay of emotions and reasoning. I read a chapter; I feel a certain way about it. I return to verify or falsify my feeling. Perhaps, the feeling changes as I analyze. Perhaps, the initial analysis agrees
with the initial feeling. Or perhaps, feeling and analysis disagree, in which case, it is evident to me that the analysis is incomplete. i) Note that feeling can be said to “lead” the intellect in some senses.
My feelings indicate what, to me, is in need of analysis. ii) Once I am entirely satisfied emotionally, the analysis usually ends. iii) If I had no emotions at all about the book, I would not keep on
reading it, much less write about it. iv) It is hard to imagine any theoretical or rational inquiry which is not dependent on emotion in some such way. Cf. “cognitive rest” in DKG. d) Emotions and reason, then, form a single complex set of capacities by which we seek to respond rightly to our world. (Other capacities are also part of the complex—sense-experience, imagination, etc.) Each involves the other. e) Scripture never suggests that emotions are naturally more sinful or less sanctified than reason, or vice-versa. Man, as a whole, is depraved and, as a whole, is redeemed. At some particular point, however, emotion may signal an inadequacy in our reasoning [iv.c), above] or vice-versa. (Checks and balances.)
f) Scripture never suggests that emotions in general must be subordinated to reason or vice-versa, (the former in Greek thought, the latter in, e.g., Hume). (Contra Gordon H. Clark, “The Primacy of the Intellect”.)
i) The emotions and the reason ought to agree, to be sure. ii) “Disagreements between emotions and reason” are best understood as disagreements between one set of emotion-reasons and another set of emotion-reasons. One set will have a more emotional cast, the other, a more rational cast, but neither will be totally devoid of either emotion or reason. iii) In cases where “reason and emotion disagree,” the resolution may involve a better analysis or a better (more godly) emotional response to the previous analysis. The direction of the solution is not dictated by the nature of reason and emotion as such. iv) Illustration: you are persuaded rationally that there can be no good in Pentecostal worship; but, when you attend a service, you find yourself (surprisingly!) clapping along, singing, shouting Amen from the heart. Do you simply rebuke your emotions for contradicting your intellect? Do you simply abandon your previous conviction because it no longer “feels right”? Neither. Think it through, pray about it, study Scripture, train yourself in godly emotions. It could go either way.
v. Summary: Emotions are aspects of our ethical sensitivity, our aistheteria. We dare not neglect them as we seek to “prove what the will of the Lord is.”